Cardinal Mundelein of Chicago and the Shaping of Twentieth-Century American Catholicism

Edward R. Kantowicz

When George Cardinal Mundelein of Chicago built his massive major seminary of St. Mary of the Lake in the 1920s, he designed its facades on early American, neoclassic lines, but he molded the seminary rules from Roman models. The exterior of the seminary library resembled Thomas Jefferson’s University of Virginia, but the interior was an exact replica of the Barberini Palace in Rome. American on the outside, but Roman to the core—this had been the goal of the American Catholic church from the days of John Carroll’s consecration as first bishop in 1789. The leaders of the Catholic minority tried to forge a community that was different in values from the American norm, but not too foreign, a community separate but equal.¹

Remaining separate was not difficult for a church composed largely of immigrants. Builder bishops and brick-and-mortar priests raised enough churches and parochial schools in the nineteenth century to ensure a separate institutional base for Catholics. Doctrinal intransigence and puritanical morals also kept Catholics distinctive in a Protestant but increasingly secular nation. Yet until well into the twentieth century, American Catholics did not feel equal to other Americans or even to other Catholics elsewhere in the world.

Though the Catholic community was the largest American religious denomination as early as 1850, it lacked status and respect, both in Rome and in America. Rome considered the United States a mission territory as late as 1908, and in its mediation of various church disputes in the nineteenth century, the Roman Congregation of the Propaganda, which administered the church in mission lands, consistently misunderstood events in America. American Protestants, for their part, feared and mistrusted the Catholic church as an un-American invader of the Republic.²

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¹ The novelist Wilfrid Sheed has made this point very well in a book of essays, Wilfred Sheed, Three Mobs: Labor, Church, and Mafia (New York, 1974), 2–3.
² For general histories of American Catholicism, see John Tracy Ellis, American Catholicism (Chicago, 1956); John Cogley, Catholic America (New York, 1973); Thomas T. McAvoy, A
Just before the turn of the century, a number of "Americanist" bishops, notably John Ireland and James Cardinal Gibbons, attempted to upgrade the American Catholic image. They labored to explain American conditions to the cardinals of the Propaganda, and they established connections with political leaders in Washington, all the while trumpeting in sermons the church's compatibility with American ideals. But in 1899 Pope Leo XIII condemned a vague set of doctrines that he called "Americanism." Though no individual was directly censured, American Catholic leaders felt confused and dispirited, and American Protestants believed that their misgivings about the church had been confirmed. American Catholics remained too Roman for the native Protestants and too American for Rome. It fell, then, to the leaders of twentieth-century American Catholicism to make the separate Catholic community feel equal, fully Catholic, and fully American.

In the years surrounding World War I, a generation of American-born but Roman-trained bishops came to power in the largest urban dioceses of the United States. These men—such as Cardinal Mundelein in Chicago, William Cardinal O'Connell in Boston, Denis Cardinal Dougherty in Philadelphia, John Cardinal Glennon in St. Louis, and, at a somewhat later date, Francis Cardinal Spellman in New York—were "consolidating bishops" who, like their counterparts in American business and government, saw the need for order and efficiency in their bailiwicks. Despite its hierarchical structure and theological dogmatism, the Catholic church in the United States had been decentralized and disorganized. The consolidating bishops of the first half of the twentieth century centralized and tightened the administrative struc-


ture of the church in the largest dioceses and tied American Catholicism more closely to headquarters in Rome. They also gained new respect for the American Catholic church, both in Rome, where their financial support became the mainstay of the "prisoner in the Vatican," and in the United States, where their business ability and political influence bolstered the self-image of their American subcommunity.5

To become fully American, yet remain distinctive, required confidence and a sense of security. The American Catholic church, with its dual nature, had always presented a paradox in this respect. Supremely confident ideologically, the church knew that it was right and everyone else was wrong. Yet, as a church of immigrant outsiders, it showed an acute lack of confidence socially. The goal of Cardinal Mundelein and his colleagues was to overcome this lack of social confidence and, in the homely expression of many church leaders, to "put the Church on the map." By their actions, the consolidating bishops gave the American Catholic church self-confidence and clout at home and at the Vatican.6

Mundelein can serve as a case study of these episcopal leaders who shaped the twentieth-century Catholic experience in America.7 His life reads like an American success story. Born in 1872 and raised in the oldest German parish in New York City, he turned down a bid to the Naval Academy in 1889 and entered instead upon priestly studies for the Brooklyn diocese. Ordained in 1895, he became chancellor of the diocese two years later, a monsignor at age thirty-four, and an auxiliary bishop at thirty-seven. In 1915, when Rome appointed him to head the Chicago archdiocese, one of the three largest in the country, he became the youngest archbishop in America. Mundelein administered the Catholic church in Chicago from 1916 until his death in 1939, becoming a cardinal in 1924. Churchmen and laymen alike esteemed him primarily for his business acumen. One of his secular admirers flattered him: "There was a great mistake in making you a Bishop instead of a financier, for in the latter case Mr. Morgan would not be without a rival in Wall Street."8

Yet he was also a thoroughgoing Romanist. He studied theology in Rome for four years, at the Urban College of the Propaganda, and was ordained in the Eternal City. He wrote a treatise defending Pope Pius X's condemnation of

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6 "Putting the Church on the map" is a phrase encountered repeatedly in interviews with surviving churchmen who knew Mundelein; it was used by contemporaries as well. See, for example, Charles O'Hern to George William Cardinal Mundelein, Jan. 23, 1917, doc. no. 4-1917-M-268, Archives of the Archdiocese of Chicago [St. Mary of the Lake Seminary, Mundelein, Ill.].

7 For biographical details, see Martin, First Cardinal of the West, 25-43; Finn, Twenty-Four American Cardinals, 150-68; Thornton, Our American Princes, 121-36; Menceluslaus J. Madaj, "First Cardinal of the Archdiocese of Chicago, New World [Chicago archdiocesan newspaper], Aug. 30, 1974, pp. 7-9; U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1880 manuscript census schedules, New York County, New York, Enumeration District no. 141, p. 23 [Midwest Regional Federal Records Center, National Archives, Chicago, Ill.].

Modernism, earning admission to one of the ancient Roman scholarly academies. As archbishop of Chicago he carefully organized and promoted the annual Peter's Pence collection for the support of the pope, regularly producing more revenue for this cause than any other diocese in the world.

Though a striking individual, Mundelein shared many characteristics with his episcopal contemporaries in the heavily Catholic cities of the Northeast and the Midwest. In 1920, eleven of the twelve bishops in the dozen largest dioceses of the United States were American-born, and seven of the twelve had received a significant portion of their seminary training in Rome. Counting only the six largest sees, five of the six bishops were Roman-trained. Mundelein was younger than his colleagues, and he was not Irish, as all of the others in the largest dioceses were, but his tenure of twenty-three years in Chicago came close to the average of twenty-five-and-one-half years for all twelve bishops. These bishops, then, were American-born, Irish (except for Mundelein), Roman-trained, and long tenured as leaders of the most Catholic cities in America. Their twelve dioceses (all except New Orleans were in the northeast quarter of the United States) contained 46 percent of the nation's Catholics.9

The leaders of big-city Catholicism set the tone for the American church. In rural areas and in large parts of the South and West (what Catholics called "no-priest land"), Catholics remained either invisible or apologetic, but in the large cities of the Northeast and Midwest, Catholic leaders visibly threw their weight around in an attempt to instill self-confidence in their flocks. The activities of big city bishops to gain prestige and raise Catholic self-esteem can be considered under five headings: giantism, "going first class," businesslike administration, Americanism, and advising presidents and politicos.

Like any insecure class of outsiders, the Catholic bishops began with the assumption that bigger is better. Building on a massive scale proclaimed Catholic importance. This impulse had been present in the American church for a long time, as St. Patrick's Cathedral, built on Fifth Avenue in New York in the nineteenth century, illustrates. In the twentieth century, both the National Shrine of the Immaculate Conception in Washington, D.C., and Cardinal Glennon's new cathedral in St. Louis were designed in the eclectic style that can best be described as Babbit Byzantine or simply Catholic Big. In Chicago, Mundelein showed better architectural taste; he attempted to restrain individual pastors who wanted to memorialize themselves with massive piles of masonry.10 Yet he was not immune to the virus of giantism. An instinctive adherent to the Chicago philosophy of Daniel Burnham—"Make no little plans"—Mundelein showed his giantism most clearly in the building of Chicago's seminaries.

The Archdiocese of Chicago, despite its size, had no major seminary for training diocesan priests when Mundelein arrived in 1916. Even the high school minor seminary, begun by his predecessor Archbishop James Quigley,


was still crowded into temporary quarters. Three months after assuming his
post in Chicago, Mundelein announced that he would build a large Gothic
structure to house the minor seminary and dedicate it as a memorial to his
predecessor. When the new Quigley Preparatory Seminary opened its doors
two years later, Mundelein could not resist boasting: "This will un-
questionably be the most beautiful building here in Chicago, not excluding the
various buildings of the University of Chicago."

Though pleased with Quigley Seminary, Mundelein viewed it essentially as
a completion of his predecessor's work. He planned his own monument, the
major seminary of St. Mary of the Lake, on a grander scale. In 1918 the arch-
dioecese purchased a faltering correspondence school along with several
hundred acres of land surrounding a swampy lake about forty miles northwest
of the city center. Over the next few years, additional purchases of small
parcels in the area rounded out the property at 950 acres. Mundelein was
planning for more than a seminary. He envisioned a Catholic University of the
West to rival and perhaps surpass the struggling Catholic institution in
Washington, D.C. The country property he had bought would house the
divinity school and a central administration for the university. Individual
religious orders, such as the Jesuits and the Dominicans, would be invited to
locate their own houses of divinity studies around St. Mary's Lake, making
this institution the most high-powered theological center outside of Rome.
The secular subjects would be taught at the preexisting Catholic colleges of
Loyola and DePaul in the city, but all would be combined and coordinated
under the one umbrella of the University and Seminary of St. Mary of the
Lake.

Mundelein himself recognized the audacity of this project. He wrote pri-
vately, before any plans had been announced: "It will take millions to com-
plete it, and I doubt whether I will live long enough to do it, though I will plan
it and perhaps begin it." He was able to begin in 1920 when Edward Hines,
founder of a large lumber company in Chicago, donated $500,000 toward the
divinity wing of the university in honor of his son who had died in France
during the war.

This donation was not completely unexpected, nor, for that matter, gratis. A
few months previously, Mundelein had done Hines a favor when his first
attempt to erect a monument to his son had turned into a nightmare. Hines
had built a large hospital building on the grounds of an old speedway which he
owned, intending to sell it at cost to the government for the care of war
wounded. However, amid charges of graft and profiteering, Congress held up
appropriations for the purchase of Speedway Hospital for nearly a year and a

11 New World, May 12, 1916, p. 1; July 23, 1916, p. 1; Mundelein to Joseph M. Cudahy, Nov. 25,
1916, doc. no. 2-1916-C-52, Archives of the Archdiocese of Chicago.
12 Harry Koenig, "University and Seminary of St. Mary of the Lake," undated typescript [St.
Mary of the Lake Seminary Library, Mundelein, Ill.]; New World, April 30, 1920, p. 1; J. Gerald
Kealy interview with Edward R. Kantowicz, May 21, 1966; Reynold Hillenbrand interview with
13 Mundelein to Rodolfo A. Correa, Nov. 23, 1918, doc. no. 4-1918-C-14, Archives of the Arch-
dioecese of Chicago.
half. Though the government finally took over the hospital on March 13, 1920, and no wrongdoing was ever proven on the part of Hines or anyone else, the unfavorable publicity had induced the directors of the Continental Bank, Chicago's largest, to drop Hines from his position on their board. Mundelein intervened, using his personal influence to have Hines retained on the bank board. After first satisfying himself by inquiries in Washington that Hines was blameless in the Speedway Hospital affair, Mundelein wrote directly and candidly to J. Ogden Armour, one of the principal directors of the bank: "I have reason to expect that Mr. Hines will be very liberal in support of some of my undertakings... and I will confess that independent of the merits of the case, I shall consider as a personal favor to me whatever assistance you can lend."

Armed with the $500,000 donation, Mundelein announced his plans at the end of April 1920, giving Hines full publicity for his generosity. Blueprints had been prepared previously by a young Catholic architect, Joseph W. McCarthy, who had apprenticed in the firm of Burnham and attracted the bishop's attention with some church building he had done in Chicago. The plans envisioned nine major buildings for the divinity school aligned along the arms of a Latin cross, with the main chapel, a monumental plaza, and a ceremonial dock and boathouse forming the upright of the cross. A large mausoleum for Edward Hines, Jr., was included in the plans. All the buildings were to be in red brick, early-American, neoclassic design, with the main chapel an enlarged copy of a Congregational meetinghouse in Old Lyme, Connecticut. Mundelein had, on a previous occasion, proclaimed his fondness for this architectural style, calling it "symbolical of the twin devotions of your heart, love of God and love of country."

The university portion of Mundelein's scheme quickly fell through. The individual religious orders were not eager to merge their independent institutions or to relocate their houses of divinity. The Catholic University in Washington viewed the Chicago plan as a direct threat and lobbied against it in Rome. But Mundelein pushed ahead with his seminary, which opened in the fall of 1921 with the first buildings still incomplete. Substantially finished by 1926, when the first class was ordained, St. Mary of the Lake seminary was finally completed with the dedication of its auditorium in 1934. By considerable arm-twisting at the Vatican, Cardinal Mundelein obtained from Rome the status of pontifical university for St. Mary of the Lake in 1929, an honor that permitted the conferring of doctoral degrees in theology.

14 For the official version of the bequest, see New World, April 30, 1920, p. 1. The Speedway Hospital affair can be followed in the New York Times, Jan. 26, 1919, p. 17; Feb. 19, 1919, p. 24; July 16, 1919, p. 17; July 18, 1919, p. 4; March 1, 1920, p. 16; March 3, 1920, p. 10; March 16, 1920, p. 5; Oct. 25, 1921, p. 16. For Mundelein's behind-the-scenes maneuvers, see Mundelein to Joseph Tumulty, April 20, 1919, doc. no. 5-1919-T-1, Archives of the Archdiocese of Chicago; Mundelein to Tumulty, May 13, 1919, doc. no. 5-1919-T-2, ibid.; Mundelein to J. Ogden Armour, Nov. 1, 1919, doc. no. 5-1919-A-5, ibid.; Armour to Mundelein, Nov. 4, 1919, doc. no. 5-1919-M-19, ibid.

15 George William Mundelein, "Address at the Dedication of the Church-School St. Thomas of Canterbury, Chicago, June 24, 1917," Two Crowded Years [Chicago, 1918], 58.

16 Kealy interview; Hillenbrand interview; Koenig interview; F. X. McMenamy to Mundelein, July 27, 1920, doc. no. 6-1920-M-48, Archives of the Archdiocese of Chicago; Vladimir Cardinal Ledochowski to Mundelein, Jan. 6, 1921, doc. no. 6-1921-M-18, ibid.
Though Mundelein's dream for St. Mary of the Lake was not completely fulfilled, the seminary and its extensive campus gave him a showcase. Visiting cardinals or other dignitaries were inevitably driven the forty miles out into the country for a grand tour or, in the early days, a cornerstone laying. Lake County, where the seminary was located, was heavily Protestant, and the archdiocese even had to fight off a local court challenge to St. Mary's tax exempt status. Nevertheless, the citizens of the nearby town of Harper, like good boosters everywhere, recognized the importance of their institutional neighbor. In 1925 they voted to rename their town Mundelein. Local real estate developers advertised that their tracts stood near an "Athens of America."  

The secluded acres of Mundelein, Illinois, formed a backdrop for the most spectacular example of giantism during the cardinal's regime, the Twenty-eighth International Eucharistic Congress of 1926. First held in France in 1881, the biannual Eucharistic Congress had become a massive pilgrimage of priests, prelates, and laypeople. This devotional gathering had come to the New World only once, to Montreal in 1910, and never to the United States. Since the gathering always climax ed with a street procession, fear of anti-Catholic demonstrations usually kept the congress out of Protestant lands. At the congress in London in 1908, the English government banned the procession altogether. But Mundelein's thousand-acre seminary provided a solution to this problem. Though most of the events of the 1926 congress were conducted in Chicago churches or in the lakefront Soldiers' Field, some 800,000 pilgrims went by auto or by interurban rail to St. Mary of the Lake for the final day's procession. Such a massive demonstration was hardly private, but since it took place on private property, no one could protest. The Chicago Catholic weekly newspaper, the New World, cautioned its readers: "Let there be no mistaking the fact that the Eucharistic Congress is no endeavor to demonstrate strength. There is no thought behind it of a flaunting of vast numbers before non-Catholics. . . . It is distinctly a religious manifestation."  

Nevertheless, a "flaunting of vast numbers before non-Catholics" is precisely what the Eucharistic Congress was, a once-in-a-lifetime media event for the Catholic church in Chicago. And it was successful in those terms. Protestant ministers in the Bible Belt may have been scandalized by this Romish display; one New York Methodist clergymen remarked that "the pomp of services, the exaltation of ecclesiastics may remove the thoughts of men from the humble Nazarene." But in Chicago boosterism and civic pride overcame any non-Catholic fears. The Chicago Tribune's welcoming editorial summed up the local attitude: "Chicago was chosen for the congress partly because the city is centrally located . . . but even more because the city is . . .

17 W. M. Ryan to Mundelein, May 26, 1924, doc. no. 8-1924-M-151, Archives of the Archdiocese of Chicago; Bernard J. Sheil to Ryan, June 4, 1924, doc. no. 8-1924-R-9, ibid.; New World, Dec. 23, 1921, rotogravure supplement.

typically American. The tribute to the city is one which Chicagoans have not been slow to appreciate."

Giantism and a flaunting of numbers were basic parts of the church’s drive for status in the twentieth century. A more subtle form of the same impulse could be described as "going first class" whenever possible. Mundelein’s seminary again illustrates the point. At a time when nearly all Catholic seminaries comprised a single building with spartan dormitory accommodations for the students, St. Mary’s was a sprawling, multibuilding complex. Each seminarian had a private room and bath, a luxury that scandalized many older priests and one that many of the immigrant-bred students certainly did not enjoy at home. Eighty acres of the grounds were laid out as a golf course for the seminarians and for the priests of the archdiocese. On major holidays, the cardinal tried to devise unique surprises for the seminarians. He once flew in fresh lobsters for the entire student body, but most of the midwestern boys had never seen such a strange meal before and returned it to the kitchen untouched.

"Going first class" was the rule in other areas besides seminary training. The legal work of the archdiocese had traditionally been handled on an ad hoc basis by individual Irish Catholic lawyers and partnerships. In 1923, when the county court of Lake County struck down the tax exemption for a major part of the seminary property, Mundelein feared that the small law firm handling the case might be inadequate to secure a reversal on appeal. One of his closest lay advisers, a State Street clothing store executive, suggested that the law firm of Patterson, Kirkland, McCormick, and Fleming be called in. The McCormick in the title referred to Chicago Tribune publisher, Colonel Robert R. McCormick, who founded the firm in 1908. Since then the firm had become Chicago’s most prestigious, handling the Tribune’s business and many other major accounts. After senior partner Perry Patterson successfully completed the appeal of the seminary tax case, he proposed to Cardinal Mundelein that the archdiocese abandon ad hoc arrangements and retain his firm on a yearly basis for all legal work. Mundelein readily agreed, writing Patterson: "I have followed your good advice and have placed Patterson, Kirkland, McCormick, and Fleming under contract to act as the watchdogs of my treasury and the defenders of my rights, always on the principle of the Fathers of our Republic, ‘millions for defense but not a penny for tribute.’"

The imperial tone in Mundelein’s response to Patterson was thoroughly in character. As a cardinal prince of the church, Mundelein affected the style of a

20 A good description of the seminary regime was provided by the first rector, J. Gerald Kealy. New World, May 23, 1924, pp. 9-10.
21 The tax case was decided by the Illinois Supreme Court. See People ex rel. Ira E. Pearsoll, County Collector v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, Oct. 1923, doc. no. 7-1923-C-21, Archives of the Archdiocese of Chicago. See also Perry Patterson to Mundelein, Feb. 20, 1924, doc. no. 8-1924-M-267, ibid.; Samuel Homes to D. F. Kelly, March 9, 1924, doc. no. 8-1924-K-5, ibid.; Patterson to Kelly, April 21, 1924, doc. no. 8-1924-K-3, ibid.; Mundelein to Patterson, July 24, 1924, doc. no. 8-1924-P-11, ibid.
Renaissance prince in public. He clearly loved ceremony both for its own sake and for the reflected glory it shone on his church. He was an inveterate collector of old manuscripts, famous autographs, rare stamps and coins, and a connoisseur of old wines. He bought large numbers of paintings—not Old Masters, which were too costly, but large canvases "from the school of" Rubens, Titian, or some other well known painter—to line the walls of the seminary buildings. In 1930, McCarthy, by then Mundelein's personal architect, completed a villa for the cardinal across the lake from the major seminary buildings. This house, a close copy of George Washington's Mount Vernon, became Mundelein's principal residence, even though the archdiocese already owned a handsome episcopal mansion in the city just off Lincoln Park.22

"Going first class" as a prince of the church was a calculated risk for Mundelein. It could, and perhaps did, evoke Protestant fears of the church's foreign and antirepublican connections. On the other hand, Americans love a show, and they frequently fawn over royalty with all its ceremony. Mundelein shrewdly gambled that a magnificent display of Catholic power and self-confidence would do more good than harm to the American Catholic image, and he carefully included American trappings, such as the Mount Vernon model for his villa, in the display.

In the 1920s, the "business of America was business"; so going first class meant, above all, cultivating a businesslike image. The cardinal formed close friendships with the local financiers on LaSalle Street, such as Walter Cummings and William Reynolds of the Continental Bank and Harold L. Stuart of the Halsey-Stuart brokerage firm, upon whom he often called for short-term loans. He also retained enough connections in New York circles so that he could occasionally do an end run around the local banks and obtain more favorable rates on Wall Street. Probably his most talked about business friendship was with the utilities magnate, Samuel Insull, but this relationship has been much exaggerated. The two had met through their broker, Stuart, and apparently admired each other's abilities; but they had few, if any, mutual business dealings. When Insull's utilities empire came crashing down in the early 1930s, Mundelein appeared as a character witness at the Insull mail fraud trial in November 1934. He was not testifying for Insull, however, but for one of the codefendants, Stuart, who was probably the cardinal's closest financial advisor.23

Mundelein's own reputation as a fundraiser was well merited. During the 1920s, Chicago Catholics contributed annually, on the average, about $120,000 to Peter's Pence, over $200,000 to the work of the missions, and almost $750,000 for local Catholic charity work. The Chicago cardinal employed numerous publicity gimmicks in the course of fund raising. One year he sponsored a contest among parishes for the greatest support of the mis-

22 Patrick J. Hayes interview with Kantowicz, Nov. 26, 1975; Kealy interview.
sions, figured on a per capita basis, and rewarded the three winning parishes with sacred relics and church vessels blessed by the pope. When soliciting from business establishments, Mundelein employed what he called "the methods of our Jewish friends" by pointing out the advertising value of the diocese's lists of contributors.24

When persuasion and publicity failed, he resorted to obligatory assessments or taxes on each parish. Such assessments had been used in the past in emergency situations, but they became a regular part of diocesan finance under Mundelein. For example, in 1924 a quota was imposed on each parish to help defray the mounting costs of seminary construction. If a pastor could not raise the amount of his quota in a special collection, he had to make up the difference from ordinary parish revenues. One million dollars was raised in this particular levy; and despite the compulsory nature of the assessment, the money was presented to Mundelein publicly as a free will offering in honor of his selection as a cardinal. The Eucharistic Congress was financed by a similar assessment.25

Mundelein was even more successful at administrating money than at raising it. Church finance and administration had been exceedingly decentralized in American dioceses. Local pastors generally made the major decisions about building loans, contractors, architects, and insurance with only loose supervision by the board of consultors [a kind of senate made up of important pastors] or the chancery office [the central administrative bureaucracy]. As a result, some pastors built outrageously expensive churches as personal monuments, whereas other parishes had to struggle along in temporary quarters for lack of funds. Mundelein took all crucial brick-and-mortar decisions away from the individual pastors. Before a pastor could build, he had to go through a nine-step process which included the bishop's approval of the architect, a full discussion of the parish finances by the board of consultors, and the constant supervision of the project by a two-man subcommittee of consultors. Pastors were encouraged to consolidate short-term loans into mortgages, and the chancery office helped find lenders at reasonable rates.26

In order to shift capital internally within the archdiocese, Mundelein used his corporate bonding power to create a central banking mechanism. Legally constituted as a corporation sole, the Catholic Bishop of Chicago had the power to issue bonds. Mundelein's predecessors had occasionally used this power to sell Catholic Bishop of Chicago [CBC] bonds on the open market.

24 New World, June 11, 1920, p. 2; June 13, 1924, p. 1; Feb. 6, 1925, p. 1; Feb. 13, 1925, p. 1; April 16, 1926, p. 1; April 13, 1928, p. 1; Mundelein to Kelly, Nov. 3, 1919, doc. no. 5-1919-K-44, Archives of the Archdiocese of Chicago. Especially helpful on financial matters were Hayes interview; Kealy interview; Kerwin interview; and Cletus F. O'Donnell interview with Kantowicz, June 1, 1976.

25 An example of an emergency assessment before Mundelein's time was the levy to rebuild St. Mary's Training School, which burned down in 1899. See doc. no. 1-1900-F-4, Archives of the Archdiocese of Chicago. The 1924 assessment was billed as a free will offering in New World, May 16, 1924, p. 1. But it is clear from the annual parish financial reports in bound volumes at the Archives of the Archdiocese of Chicago that this and similar assessments were mandatory.

Mundelein continued the practice, but he also required parishes that showed a surplus in any given year to invest the money only in CBC bonds. In effect, the wealthier parishes loaned money to the poorer parishes with the bishop and the chancery office as intermediaries. In 1926, for example, nearly $2 million was shifted in this manner. Later Mundelein refined the system, upon the advice of Stuart, by supplementing the CBC bonds with a several million dollar line of credit at the major downtown banks. Together the two forms of centralized credit allowed for rational planning and management of diocesan growth. Cardinal Spellman of New York is sometimes credited with devising the first central bank in a Catholic diocese, but Mundelein's system predates Spellman's by twenty years.27

Both in fundraising and in administration Mundelein applied modern American business techniques to an archaic institution. Money management was at the heart of the American Catholic drive for status, as Rome became increasingly dependent on American largesse. At the turn of the century, the whole American church donated about $80,000 to the pope in Peter's Pence offerings. In 1920, Chicago alone sent $120,000 to the Pope. When Mundelein was in Rome to become a cardinal, he noted the impact American financial largesse had made: "I had not been in Rome for fifteen years. Then we were looked upon as a nation of dollar-makers and dollar-seekers. Now the attitude was changed. We had shown that when it was a question of human lives... we threw our dollars away for this purpose even quicker than we made them. The attitude was now one of respect."28 It was Mundelein's conviction that the American church had taken the place of France as the "eldest daughter of the Church." As France in the nineteenth century had defended the Papal States militarily and protected the Catholic missions in colonial lands, American Catholics now sustained both the Vatican and its worldwide missions with money.

Businesslike management earned the respect of American businessmen as well. The Archdiocese of Chicago never had any problems marketing its CBC bonds; even during the depression of the 1930s these bonds rarely dropped below par. Ordinarily the archbishop was able to borrow from the banks at a percentage point below the market rate of interest. There was an oft-repeated comment, variously attributed to Julius Rosenwald of Sears, Roebuck, Frederick Eckert of Metropolitan Life, or to other business leaders, that Mundelein missed his calling by going into religion rather than business.29


28 New World, Jan. 7, 1921, p. 4; May 16, 1924, p. 1.

29 Mundelein to E. B. Ledvina, Feb. 10, 1920, doc. no. 6-1920-L-6, Archives of the Archdiocese of Chicago. Mundelein's personal lawyer attributed the business quote to Rosenwald; Msgr. Harry
Mundelein and his colleagues also strove to earn respect and approval in the non-Catholic community by a policy of vigorous, 100 percent American patriotism. But, while doing this, they had to be careful not to stir up a new "Americanism" controversy in Rome. Pope Leo XIII's 1899 letter, Testem Benevolentiae, which condemned "Americanism," had been veiled in ambiguity. Basically, the condemnation formed part of the Vatican's longstanding feud with doctrinal modernism; it manifested a deep fear of any attempt at the development of doctrine. Thus, what the pope condemned as "Americanism" included the notion that Catholic doctrine ought to be watered down or soft-pedaled in the modern world as well as the idea that active virtues and individual effort were superior to contemplative prayer and obedient submission to authority. But the pope carefully pointed out that he was not censuring the "characteristic qualities which reflect honor on the people of America" nor "the laws and customs which prevail [in the United States]." In short, if American individualism and pragmatism were raised to the level of theological doctrine, the pope condemned them. But if they were only practiced by American Catholics, he would look the other way. This byzantine line of reasoning gave Mundelein's generation of American Catholic leaders their opportunity to solve the Americanism puzzle. They avoided theological and philosophical reasoning altogether, and constantly reiterated their rigid adherence to Roman doctrine, thus making their anti-intellectualism into a virtue. They then plunged headfirst into symbolic and emotional bursts of American patriotism on issues they knew would not irritate Rome.30

Mundelein, for example, aligned himself with the "'100 percent' attitude toward ethnic assimilation in America. In his first interview after being appointed to the Chicago archdiocese, he stated firmly that he did not believe in hyphens: "The people of the United States must be Americans or something else. They cannot serve two masters." He believed that the transitional phase of immigrant accommodation in ethnic parishes had lasted long enough and that new immigrant groups should be nudged toward full assimilation. In the very first months of his administration in Chicago, Mundelein appointed a new central school board which decreed that all instruction in Catholic schools be carried on in English, with the exception of some classes in catechism and reading which might be presented in an immigrant language. The "English only" order earned widespread praise outside the church, though it was resented by immigrant Catholics. Mundelein's action anticipated and partially deflected the widespread movement by nativist politicians in the 1920s to legislate against foreign languages in the schools.31

Koenig attributed it to Eckert. William J. Campbell interview with Kantowicz, Nov. 21, 1975; Koenig interview.

30 Studies of the Americanist Controversy are cited in note 3. See also Greeley, Catholic Experience, 150-215.

World War I elicited an even greater outpouring of American patriotism from Catholic leaders. Within days of the United States declaration of war in 1917, the American archbishops hurriedly assembled and pledged unequivocal church support to the president and the war effort. Back in Chicago, Mundelein reiterated this support: "The moment the President of the United States affixed his signature to the resolutions of Congress, all differences of opinion ceased. We stand seriously, solidly and loyally behind them. They have perhaps information that is hidden from us; they may know that danger threatens this nation from more than the one quarter towards which we are looking." He also took the occasion to taunt the Catholic church's detractors: "We would ask whether the individuals or organizations, few though they may be, who have harassed us in the courts or maligned us in their scurrilous sheets in these later years, will now give some evidence of the love of country so loudly professed at a time when the country did not need them."³²

Mundelein backed up his words with action, suspending temporarily some of his own ambitious fund-raising and building plans. When the first liberty loan was solicited in June 1917, the Chicago archbishop announced his personal purchase of $10 thousand worth of bonds. He instructed every pastor to invest at least $100 of parish funds in the liberty loan, even if they had to borrow the money to do so. Mundelein appointed one of his most trusted pastors, the editor of the local Catholic newspaper, as head of a committee to coordinate Catholic cooperation with all subsequent liberty loan, Red Cross, and other war drives. Bonds of the third liberty loan were even sold in church vestibules.³³

This outpouring of wartime patriotism, as well as the efforts toward ethnic assimilation, showed clearly the deep longing for social acceptance on the part of American Catholic leaders. The hasty and unqualified support for the war effort also mainifested a justifiable fear of criticism and repression. Such Americanism, however, sincerely reflected the attitudes of Mundelein and other church leaders. Mundelein prided himself on his third-generation Americanism and frequently alluded publicly to his grandfather who had died in the Civil War. His choice of early-American architecture for the seminary was a deeply felt symbolic statement, and the Congregational church after which he modeled his main chapel was one he had visited as a boy on a New England vacation. Shortly after announcing his parochial school reorganization, Mundelein wrote to Theodore Roosevelt: "I need not tell you of course... that there is hardly any other institution here in the country that does so much to bring about a sure, safe and sane Americanization of the children of


³³ Ibid., June 1, 1917, p. 1; March 29, 1918, p. 1; May 3, 1918, p. 1; May 17, 1918, p. 1; Oct. 18, 1918, p. 1; March 28, 1919, p. 1.
emigrant people as do our parochial schools. My endeavor always will be to keep them up to the highest standard possible, so that they may be my monument rather than costly churches after I have gone, and the children that come from them be every bit as good American citizens as they are Catholics.\textsuperscript{134}

A final factor that raised the Catholic church's self-image in America was the role of Mundelein and other leading bishops in advising presidents and politicos. Political influence was a necessity for the leaders of an extensive institution like the Catholic church. The church had many interests—a separate school system, tax privileges, the welfare of its largely immigrant membership—to protect from political assaults. Naturally, political ties were closest with the Irish-dominated local Democratic party. In the early years of Mundelein's administration, the bishop's personal representative in the state legislature was the speaker of the House, an Irish Democrat named David Shanahan, who buried many bills threatening Catholic schools. In the 1930s Mundelein built a close friendship with Edward Joseph Kelly, boss of the Chicago machine. When Kelly moved to a Gold Coast apartment upon his wife's death, he donated his house to the archdiocese for use as the residence of the diocesan mission band. Though Republican politicians were not as solicitous of Catholic needs, some Republicans, such as Mayor William Hale Thompson, cleared Catholic patronage appointments with the Catholic archbishop.\textsuperscript{35}

Mundelein played a very minor role in national politics until the Great Depression. Then, during the New Deal years, he became widely known as the most liberal Catholic bishop in America and Franklin Roosevelt's staunchest Catholic supporter. The two men had met each other casually sometime around 1910, when both were rising stars in their respective fields in New York, but a close friendship did not develop until Roosevelt was president. Roosevelt initiated the relationship for purely political reasons. A priest at Catholic University in Washington suggested through an intermediary that Mundelein was sympathetic to the New Deal and that, since the cardinal was an avid collector, a presidential autograph might flatter him. Roosevelt sent Mundelein a jaunty letter and an autograph for his saint's day, April 23, 1933. The cardinal immediately wrote back and arranged a courtesy visit to the White House in May.\textsuperscript{36}

Mundelein and Franklin Roosevelt established an immediate rapport and a genuine friendship. The fact that both were devoted collectors gave them an

\textsuperscript{134} Mundelein to Theodore Roosevelt, June 5, 1916, doc. no. 3-1916-R-21, Archives of the Archdiocese of Chicago.
\textsuperscript{35} Mundelein to David E. Shanahan, April 18, 1919, doc. no. 5-1919-S-42; \textit{ibid.}; Mundelein to William Hale Thompson, April 25, 1917, doc. no. 4-1917-T-8, \textit{ibid.}.
initial point of contact, and both came to respect the other's abilities. In their
dozens or so meetings after 1933, they called each other by their first names. In
between meetings, they kept up frequent communication through inter-
mediaries. From 1935 until Mundelein's death in 1939, Thomas Corcoran, the
president's assistant, and William Campbell, the cardinal's lawyer, were the
principal couriers between the two. By chance, Corcoran was at Mundelein's
villa on presidential business the night the cardinal died.37

The Mundelein-Roosevelt relationship was a useful one for both parties. The
president needed prominent Catholic support, particularly in the late 1930s
when Alfred E. Smith, Charles E. Coughlin, and others Catholics began to
attack the New Deal as communistic and when many churchmen suspected
the administration of sympathy for Spanish loyalists and Mexican anti-
clericals. Mundelein provided such support enthusiastically. He introduced
Franklin Roosevelt for an honorary degree at Notre Dame in December 1935 at
the time of Father Coughlin's break with the administration; he deflected
Catholic criticism of Hugo Black's appointment to the Supreme Court; and he
adopted a judicious, even-handed stance of neutrality on the Spanish Civil
War. The cardinal, for his part, wanted reassurance that federal welfare funds
would be equitably distributed to the unemployed, great numbers of whom
were Catholic, and also wanted to ensure some institutional role for the
church in making the distribution. In 1935, Mundelein's personal lawyer,
Campbell, was appointed National Youth Administration (NYA) director in
Chicago; he closely coordinated the NYA work with that of the Catholic
Youth Organization in the city. The cardinal could not be unaware, either, of
the prestige which a close relationship with the president would bring to his
church. Certainly Chicago Catholics swelled with pride when Franklin
Roosevelt lunched at the cardinal's residence after delivering his "quarantine
address" in Chicago on October 5, 1937.38

In the last two years of his life Mundelein served the president in the ad-
ditional role of unofficial diplomat. After trips to Rome in 1938 and 1939, the
 cardinal reported to the president whatever news from troubled Europe he had
obtained at the neutral listening post of the Vatican. On these trips, too, he
was negotiating the president's plan to send a personal emissary to the Vatican
and establish quasi-official relations. Shortly after Mundelein's death, the
newly appointed Archbishop Spellman of New York, who was also in contact
with Franklin Roosevelt through Corcoran, completed these diplomatic

37 Hayes interview; Campbell interview; Thomas Corcoran interview with Kantowicz, Nov. 7,
1975.

214–22, 458; Flynn, American Catholics and the Roosevelt Presidency, 183–84; Charles J. Tull,
Father Coughlin and the New Deal (Syracuse, 1965), 203; New World, Oct. 13, 1933, p. 1; July 26,
1937, p. 4; John F. O'Hara to Franklin Roosevelt, Nov. 18, 1935, President's Personal File no.
2329, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers; O'Hara to McIntyre, Nov. 26, 1935, ibid.; O'Hara to McIn-
tyre, Dec. 5, 1935, ibid.; Mundelein to Franklin Roosevelt, Sept. 23, 1937, President's Personal
File no. 1321, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers.
arrangements; and Roosevelt announced the appointment of Myron Taylor as his representative to the Vatican.  
  
Mundelein's true importance to the Franklin Roosevelt administration should not be exaggerated. He was in no sense a policy advisor, and the New Deal would not have been different without him. Nevertheless, a German bishop from the conservative, isolationist Midwest supporting both the foreign and domestic policies of the administration was a genuine asset to the president.

More importantly, Franklin Roosevelt's friendship was a spectacular asset to the Catholic church in America. Ideologically, the New Deal permitted Catholic leaders to exercise the prophetic role of social critics without appearing disloyal. The turn-of-the-century Americanist bishops, such as John Ireland, had been spread-eagle Fourth of July patriots and social conservatives, fearful that even a hint of social criticism would mar their image of Americanism. During World War I, the whole Catholic hierarchy, including Mundelein, hastened to support the war effort lest the church appear disloyal. But when the president himself flailed at "economic royalists" during the depression, Catholic leaders could exercise a more critical role without appearing un-American. Mundelein did not hesitate to attack the power of concentrated wealth on a number of occasions in the 1930s, and his auxiliary bishop, Bernard J. Sheil, was an outspoken supporter of John L. Lewis and the Congress of Industrial Organizations.  

More concretely, Franklin Roosevelt gave extensive patronage recognition to Catholics. Two members named to the original cabinet and about one-quarter of all judicial appointments were Catholics, while the president was himself surrounded by Catholics in his personal entourage—Corcoran, Grace Tully, and Marguerite ("Missy") Le Hand. The personal connections of Mundelein and Spellman with the president completed the image of importance which Catholics enjoyed during the New Deal.

In November 1938, when Mundelein sailed to Rome for the beatification of Mother Cabrini, it was an open secret that he also had presidential business to conduct with the pope. Franklin Roosevelt, with Mundelein's foreknowledge, stage-managed a triumphal entry into Europe for the cardinal in order to impress both Mussolini and Pius with the importance he attached to Mundelein's mission. The battle cruiser Omaha, United States flagship in the Mediterranean, escorted Mundelein's steamship into Naples on November 5, and both Rear-Admiral Henry E. Lackey and American ambassador to Italy William Phillips greeted the cardinal at a luncheon aboard the cruiser. Ambassador Phillips and a papal undersecretary of state then escorted Mundelein to Rome.

40 Mundelein's most noteworthy prolabor speech was delivered on Jan. 2, 1938, to the annual assembly of the Chicago Holy Name Society. He stated: "The trouble with us in the past has been that we were too often allied or drawn into an alliance with the wrong side. . . . Our place is beside the poor, behind the working man." New World, Jan. 7, 1938, p. 1.
41 Flynn, American Catholics and the Roosevelt Presidency, 50-51; Corcoran interview.
by special train. Such red-carpet treatment of an American cardinal, both by the papacy and by the American government, was indeed satisfying to American Catholics. It signaled the achievement of a status long strived for—fully American and fully Catholic.\textsuperscript{42}

In his career as archbishop of Chicago, Cardinal Mundelein had manifested the thoroughly American belief that the best way to win respect was to buy it, whether with financial support for the pope or political support for the president. He exploited also the American weakness for royalty and display and understood that humility, though a virtue, was no way to gain attention. The other leading bishops of the early twentieth century shared many of Mundelein's characteristics. Most of them either built or expanded seminaries in their dioceses, reorganized their central administrations, collected large sums for the pope, the Propagation of the Faith, and local charitable works, and exercised political influence both publicly and privately. Cardinal O'Connell of Boston even pursued a brick-and-mortar dream as grandiose as Mundelein's seminary. With a multimillion-dollar bequest left him by a theater magnate, O'Connell bought up hilltop sites for a "Little Rome" in Brighton, Massachusetts. A monastery, a hospital, a retreat house, the Jesuits' Boston College, and the cardinal's mansion itself dotted the hills of Brighton as part of O'Connell's program for "getting the Catholic Church in Boston out of the catacombs." In New York, at midcentury Cardinal Spellman refined the administrative work of his predecessors into an efficient, centralized system of diocesan banking, purchasing, and insurance. In his additional role of bishop ordinary of the armed forces, he rivaled Bob Hope in the publicity accorded his whirlwind troop tours.\textsuperscript{43}

The careers of O'Connell, Mundelein, and Spellman spanned the entire period from the turn of the century to Vatican II. Their leadership and that of similar bishops in other cities, plus the growing numbers and wealth of American Catholics, achieved separate but equal status for the Catholic church in the United States. Inheriting a strong institutional base and a morally intransigent faith, the twentieth-century bishops "put the Church on the map" and "got it out of the catacombs" by providing highly visible leadership and instilling pride and confidence in American Catholics. Winthrop Hudson has pointed out in his popular history of American Protestantism that by the 1950s it was impossible to imagine that the death of any national Protestant leader could command the attention that accompanied the death of an American cardinal.\textsuperscript{44} With money, morals, and masonry, Cardinal Mundelein and his contemporaries raised the status of the American Catholic church so that it could command such attention.


\textsuperscript{44} Winthrop S. Hudson, \textit{American Protestantism} [Chicago, 1961], 130.